中国科学院软件研究所机构知识库
Advanced  
ISCAS OpenIR  > 软件所图书馆  > 会议论文
Title:
prevent kernel return-oriented programming attacks using hardware virtualization
Author: Tian Shuo ; He Yeping ; Ding Baozeng
Source: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Conference Name: 8th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2012
Conference Date: April 9, 2012 - April 12, 2012
Issued Date: 2012
Conference Place: Hangzhou, China
Keyword: Security of data ; Security systems
Indexed Type: EI
ISSN: 0302-9743
ISBN: 9783642291005
Department: (1) Institution of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences China; (2) Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences China
Abstract: ROP attack introduced briefly in this paper is a serious threat to compute systems. Kernel ROP attack is great challenge to existing defenses because attackers have system privilege, little prerequisite to mount attacks, and the disability of existing countermeasures against runtime attacks. A method preventing kernel return-oriented programming attack is proposed, which creates a separated secret address space for control data taking advantage of VMM architecture. The secret address space is implemented as a shadow stack on the same host with the target OS facilited by hardware virtualization techniques. The experience result shows the performance overhead in our implementation is about 10% and acceptable in practical. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
English Abstract: ROP attack introduced briefly in this paper is a serious threat to compute systems. Kernel ROP attack is great challenge to existing defenses because attackers have system privilege, little prerequisite to mount attacks, and the disability of existing countermeasures against runtime attacks. A method preventing kernel return-oriented programming attack is proposed, which creates a separated secret address space for control data taking advantage of VMM architecture. The secret address space is implemented as a shadow stack on the same host with the target OS facilited by hardware virtualization techniques. The experience result shows the performance overhead in our implementation is about 10% and acceptable in practical. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Language: 英语
Content Type: 会议论文
URI: http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15730
Appears in Collections:软件所图书馆_会议论文

Files in This Item:

There are no files associated with this item.


Recommended Citation:
Tian Shuo,He Yeping,Ding Baozeng. prevent kernel return-oriented programming attacks using hardware virtualization[C]. 见:8th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2012. Hangzhou, China. April 9, 2012 - April 12, 2012.
Service
Recommend this item
Sava as my favorate item
Show this item's statistics
Export Endnote File
Google Scholar
Similar articles in Google Scholar
[Tian Shuo]'s Articles
[He Yeping]'s Articles
[Ding Baozeng]'s Articles
CSDL cross search
Similar articles in CSDL Cross Search
[Tian Shuo]‘s Articles
[He Yeping]‘s Articles
[Ding Baozeng]‘s Articles
Related Copyright Policies
Null
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike Add to Connotea Add to Del.icio.us Add to Digg Add to Reddit
所有评论 (0)
暂无评论
 
评注功能仅针对注册用户开放,请您登录
您对该条目有什么异议,请填写以下表单,管理员会尽快联系您。
内 容:
Email:  *
单位:
验证码:   刷新
您在IR的使用过程中有什么好的想法或者建议可以反馈给我们。
标 题:
 *
内 容:
Email:  *
验证码:   刷新

Items in IR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

 

Valid XHTML 1.0!
Copyright © 2007-2019  中国科学院软件研究所 - Feedback
Powered by CSpace