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Title:
daa protocol analysis and verification
Author: Qin Yu ; Chu Xiaobo ; Feng Dengguo ; Feng Wei
Source: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Conference Name: 3rd International Conference on Trusted Systems, INTRUST 2011
Conference Date: November 27, 2011 - November 29, 2011
Issued Date: 2012
Conference Place: Beijing, China
Keyword: Artificial intelligence
Indexed Type: EI
ISSN: 0302-9743
ISBN: 9783642322976
Department: (1) State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Science Beijing 100080 China
Sponsorship: Beijing Institute of Technology; ONETS Wireless and Internet Security Company; Singapore Management University; Administrative Committee of Zhongguangcun Haidian Science Park
Abstract: Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a popular trusted computing protocol for the anonymous authentication designed for TPM or other embedding devices. Many DAA schemes give out detailed cryptographic proof, however, their security properties has not been yet automatically analyzed and verified particularly against the intruder's or the malicious participant's attack. It is proposed that a DAA analysis model focusing on the intruder's attacks in this paper. The analysis method is the good supplements to the DAA cryptographic proof, though the intruder's capability is not completely assumed. According to DAA protocol status analysis, we find out some attacks like rudolph attack, masquerading attack by using the Murphi tool. At last the paper gives out the reasons for these attacks, and also presents the recommendation solutions against these attacks. From our study, we propose that DAA protocol must be carefully analyzed from the intruder attacking point of view in the DAA system design and implementation. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
English Abstract: Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a popular trusted computing protocol for the anonymous authentication designed for TPM or other embedding devices. Many DAA schemes give out detailed cryptographic proof, however, their security properties has not been yet automatically analyzed and verified particularly against the intruder's or the malicious participant's attack. It is proposed that a DAA analysis model focusing on the intruder's attacks in this paper. The analysis method is the good supplements to the DAA cryptographic proof, though the intruder's capability is not completely assumed. According to DAA protocol status analysis, we find out some attacks like rudolph attack, masquerading attack by using the Murphi tool. At last the paper gives out the reasons for these attacks, and also presents the recommendation solutions against these attacks. From our study, we propose that DAA protocol must be carefully analyzed from the intruder attacking point of view in the DAA system design and implementation. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Language: 英语
Content Type: 会议论文
URI: http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15763
Appears in Collections:软件所图书馆_会议论文

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Recommended Citation:
Qin Yu,Chu Xiaobo,Feng Dengguo,et al. daa protocol analysis and verification[C]. 见:3rd International Conference on Trusted Systems, INTRUST 2011. Beijing, China. November 27, 2011 - November 29, 2011.
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