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Title:
cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage
Author: Li Zhenqi ; Zhang Bin ; Yao Yuan ; Lin Dongdai
Source: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Conference Name: 15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012
Conference Date: November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012
Issued Date: 2013
Conference Place: Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Keyword: Geometry ; Security of data
Indexed Type: EI
ISSN: 0302-9743
ISBN: 9783642376818
Department: (1) Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing China; (2) SKLOIS Institute of Information Engineering Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing China
Abstract: In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 10.7 time and 27.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 210 32-round LBlock encryptions and 211.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 230 32-round LBlock encryptions with 28.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
English Abstract: In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 10.7 time and 27.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 210 32-round LBlock encryptions and 211.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 230 32-round LBlock encryptions with 28.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
Language: 英语
Content Type: 会议论文
URI: http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15975
Appears in Collections:软件所图书馆_会议论文

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Recommended Citation:
Li Zhenqi,Zhang Bin,Yao Yuan,et al. cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage[C]. 见:15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012. Seoul, Korea, Republic of. November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012.
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