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Title:
improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round salsa20 and chacha
Author: Shi Zhenqing ; Zhang Bin ; Feng Dengguo ; Wu Wenling
Source: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Conference Name: 15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012
Conference Date: November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012
Issued Date: 2013
Conference Place: Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Keyword: Security of data
Indexed Type: EI
ISSN: 0302-9743
ISBN: 9783642376818
Department: (1) Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China; (2) Institute of Information Engineering Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100195 China
Abstract: Salsa20 is a stream cipher designed by Bernstein in 2005 and Salsa20/12 has been selected into the final portfolio of the eSTREAM Project. ChaCha is a variant of Salsa20 with faster diffusion for similar performance. The previous best results on Salsa20 and ChaCha proposed by Aumasson et al. exploits the differential properties combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB). In this paper, we extend their approach by considering a new type of distinguishers, named (column and row) chaining distinguishers. Besides, we exhibit new high probability second-order differential trails not covered by the previous methods, generalize the notion of PNB to probabilistic neutral vectors (PNV) and show that the set of PNV is no smaller than that of PNB. Based on these findings, we present improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha. Both time and data complexities of our attacks are smaller than those of the best former results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
English Abstract: Salsa20 is a stream cipher designed by Bernstein in 2005 and Salsa20/12 has been selected into the final portfolio of the eSTREAM Project. ChaCha is a variant of Salsa20 with faster diffusion for similar performance. The previous best results on Salsa20 and ChaCha proposed by Aumasson et al. exploits the differential properties combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB). In this paper, we extend their approach by considering a new type of distinguishers, named (column and row) chaining distinguishers. Besides, we exhibit new high probability second-order differential trails not covered by the previous methods, generalize the notion of PNB to probabilistic neutral vectors (PNV) and show that the set of PNV is no smaller than that of PNB. Based on these findings, we present improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha. Both time and data complexities of our attacks are smaller than those of the best former results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
Language: 英语
Content Type: 会议论文
URI: http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15979
Appears in Collections:软件所图书馆_会议论文

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Recommended Citation:
Shi Zhenqing,Zhang Bin,Feng Dengguo,et al. improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round salsa20 and chacha[C]. 见:15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012. Seoul, Korea, Republic of. November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012.
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