| Title: | Optimal defense strategies for DDoS defender using Bayesian game model |
| Author: | Liu, Yuling (1)
; Feng, Dengguo (1)
; Lian, Yifeng (1)
; Chen, Kai (2)
; Zhang, Yingjun (1)
|
| Conference Name: | 9th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2013
|
| Conference Date: | May 12, 2013 - May 14, 2013
|
| Issued Date: | 2013
|
| Conference Place: | Lanzhou, China
|
| Publish Place: | Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany
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| Indexed Type: | EI
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| ISSN: | 3029743
|
| ISBN: | 9783642380327
|
| Department: | (1) Laboratory of Trusted Computing and Information Assurance, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Science, Beijing 100190, China; (2) University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
|
| Abstract: | In a typical DDoS attack and defense scenario, both the attacker and the defender will take actions to maximize their utilities. However, each player does not know his opponent's investment and cannot adopt the optimal strategies. We formalize a Bayesian game model to handle these uncertainties and specify two problems usually faced by the defender when choosing defense measures. A nonlinear programming method is proposed to handle policies' permutation in order to maximize the defender's utility. Followed the Nash equilibrium, security administrators can take optimal strategies. Finally, the practicality and effectiveness of the model and method are illustrated by an example. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. |
| English Abstract: | In a typical DDoS attack and defense scenario, both the attacker and the defender will take actions to maximize their utilities. However, each player does not know his opponent's investment and cannot adopt the optimal strategies. We formalize a Bayesian game model to handle these uncertainties and specify two problems usually faced by the defender when choosing defense measures. A nonlinear programming method is proposed to handle policies' permutation in order to maximize the defender's utility. Followed the Nash equilibrium, security administrators can take optimal strategies. Finally, the practicality and effectiveness of the model and method are illustrated by an example. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. |
| Language: | 英语
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| Content Type: | 会议论文
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| URI: | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16677
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| Appears in Collections: | 软件所图书馆_会议论文
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| Recommended Citation: | |
Liu, Yuling ,Feng, Dengguo ,Lian, Yifeng ,et al. Optimal defense strategies for DDoS defender using Bayesian game model[C]. 见:9th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2013. Lanzhou, China. May 12, 2013 - May 14, 2013.
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