中国科学院软件研究所机构知识库
Advanced  
ISCAS OpenIR  > 软件所图书馆  > 期刊论文
Title:
The higher-order meet-in-The-middle attack and its application to the Camellia block cipher
Author: Lu, Jiqiang (1) ; Wei, Yongzhuang (2) ; Kim, Jongsung (4) ; Pasalic, Enes (5)
Corresponding Author: Lu, J.(lvjiqiang@hotmail.com)
Keyword: Cryptology ; Block cipher ; Camellia ; Meet-in-the-middle attack ; Integral cryptanalysis
Source: Theoretical Computer Science
Issued Date: 2014
Volume: 527, Pages:102-122
Indexed Type: SCI ; EI
Department: (1) Institute for Infocomm Research, Agency for Science, Technology and Research, 1 Fusionopolis Way, Singapore 138632, Singapore; (2) Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin City, Guangxi Province 541004, China; (3) State Key Lab of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China; (4) Department of E-Business, Kyungnam University, 449 Wolyoung-dong, Masan, Kyungnam, Korea, Republic of; (5) University of Primorska FAMNIT, Koper, Slovenia
Abstract: The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length, a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits long, and a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European NESSIE selected cipher and an ISO international standard. The meet-in-The-middle attack is a technique for analysing the security of a block cipher. In this paper, we propose an extension of the meet-in-The-middle attack, which we call the higher-order meet-in-The-middle (HO-MitM) attack; the core idea of the HO-MitM attack is to use multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of "value-in-The-middle". Then we introduce a novel approach, which combines integral cryptanalysis with the meet-in-The-middle attack, to construct HO-MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits. Finally, we apply an existing approach to construct HO-MitM attacks on 14-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits. The HO-MitM attack can potentially be used to cryptanalyse other block ciphers. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
English Abstract: The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length, a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits long, and a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European NESSIE selected cipher and an ISO international standard. The meet-in-The-middle attack is a technique for analysing the security of a block cipher. In this paper, we propose an extension of the meet-in-The-middle attack, which we call the higher-order meet-in-The-middle (HO-MitM) attack; the core idea of the HO-MitM attack is to use multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of "value-in-The-middle". Then we introduce a novel approach, which combines integral cryptanalysis with the meet-in-The-middle attack, to construct HO-MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits. Finally, we apply an existing approach to construct HO-MitM attacks on 14-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits. The HO-MitM attack can potentially be used to cryptanalyse other block ciphers. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Language: 英语
WOS ID: WOS:000334011700008
Citation statistics:
Content Type: 期刊论文
URI: http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16868
Appears in Collections:软件所图书馆_期刊论文

Files in This Item:

There are no files associated with this item.


Recommended Citation:
Lu, Jiqiang ,Wei, Yongzhuang ,Kim, Jongsung ,et al. The higher-order meet-in-The-middle attack and its application to the Camellia block cipher[J]. Theoretical Computer Science,2014-01-01,527:102-122.
Service
Recommend this item
Sava as my favorate item
Show this item's statistics
Export Endnote File
Google Scholar
Similar articles in Google Scholar
[Lu, Jiqiang (1)]'s Articles
[Wei, Yongzhuang (2)]'s Articles
[Kim, Jongsung (4)]'s Articles
CSDL cross search
Similar articles in CSDL Cross Search
[Lu, Jiqiang (1)]‘s Articles
[Wei, Yongzhuang (2)]‘s Articles
[Kim, Jongsung (4)]‘s Articles
Related Copyright Policies
Null
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike Add to Connotea Add to Del.icio.us Add to Digg Add to Reddit
所有评论 (0)
暂无评论
 
评注功能仅针对注册用户开放,请您登录
您对该条目有什么异议,请填写以下表单,管理员会尽快联系您。
内 容:
Email:  *
单位:
验证码:   刷新
您在IR的使用过程中有什么好的想法或者建议可以反馈给我们。
标 题:
 *
内 容:
Email:  *
验证码:   刷新

Items in IR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

 

Valid XHTML 1.0!
Copyright © 2007-2019  中国科学院软件研究所 - Feedback
Powered by CSpace