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题名:
Ad hoc网络路由中的合作激励机制研究
作者: 黄蕾
答辩日期: 2008-01-14
授予单位: 中国科学院软件研究所
授予地点: 软件研究所
学位: 博士
关键词: Ad hoc网络 ; 按需路由协议 ; 自私 ; 合作激励 ; 声誉机制 ; 博弈论
其他题名: STUDIES ON COOPERATION INCENTIVE MECHANISM IN ROUTING OF AD HOC NETWORKS
摘要: Ad hoc网络是一种分布式的无线多跳网络。节点依赖彼此间的合作实现信息的交流。尽管针对军事行动、抢险救灾等特殊应用的Ad hoc网络可以确保节点间相互合作,但是当节点分别属于不同的利益最大化实体时,如商业应用的情况,这种合作性缺乏内在的保证,节点的自私行为将对网络造成较大的损害。 本文主要针对Ad hoc 网络寻路和数据传输阶段的非合作行为的检测和激励机制进行研究,具体工作包括:  分析了网络层节点的主动攻击类型,并根据自私节点利益最大化的根本出发点确定它们可能采用的自私行为,作为后续研究的基础。  提出了按需路由协议中寻路阶段自私行为的检测激励机制。首先通过仿真分析确定自私行为对节点的影响,然后分析了相邻节点间路由请求包RREQ中继比率的概率关系,以此为基础对节点的自私丢包行为进行检测,并根据自私程度的不同采取不同的惩罚措施。同时对路由协议进行改进,从而可以利用传统WATCHDOG机制检测路由响应包RREP的自私丢弃行为。并在公钥管理机制的支撑下,提出路由包篡改的应对方式。综合上述各项措施实现对寻路阶段的自私行为的检测和激励,并通过大量仿真对其在不同场景下的表现进行验证。  提出了无线传感器网络中数据传输阶段自私行为的检测激励机制。无线传感器以单向业务流为主的特点使得传统的基于WATCHDOG 的激励机制中的二手信息交互必不可少,这会带来安全风险和额外开销。本文利用链路层数据包和响应包之间的对应关系,对传统WATCHDOG机制进行改进,提出了全分布式的自私行为检测激励机制,避免了风险,降低了开销。仿真结果证明了所提算法的有效性。  建立简化的高层博弈模型对基于惩罚的合作激励机制在Ad hoc这样一个充满不确定性的环境中的表现进行研究,重点分析了不同类型的误判率(把合作行为误判自私行为的概率和把自私行为误判为合作行为的概率)对合作条件和合作性能的影响。结果表明,两者对合作条件的影响是对称的,但对合作性能的影响是相反的,在惩罚门限的选择上必须作出折衷。同时还分析了惩罚力度的影响,发现惩罚力度的选择存在着同样的矛盾:惩罚力度越大,合作条件越宽,但合作性能越低;反之则合作条件越严格,但性能越高。
英文摘要: Ad hoc network is a kind of distributed wireless multihop network. Information exchange is based on mutual cooperation. In the ad hoc networks of special purpose such as military or rescue application, the cooperation is intrinsic. But for commercial scenario where nodes belong to different utility maximized entities, the cooperation is not assured. Selfishness may be detrimental to the network. This dissertation focuses on detection and stimulation of selfish behavior in route discovery and data forwarding in ad hoc networks and addresses following topics: Based on utility maximization characteristics of selfish nodes, possible selfish attacks are identified from active attacks. They serve as the basis of following studies. A detection and stimulation mechanism for selfishness in route discovery of on demand routing protocols is proposed. The impact of selfishness on nodes is studied by simulations. The statistics probability distribution of ratio of relayed RREQs between the neighbor and itself is studied. Different punishments are adopted according to different degree of selfishness. A minor modification to routing protocol is proposed so that selfish dropping of route reply packet (RREP) is detected with WATCHDOG mechanism. Together with the mechanism to address fabrication and modification of routing messages, the selfishness in route discovery can be detected and stimulated. Extensive simulations show the effectiveness of the algorithm in different scenarios. A detection and stimulation mechanism for selfish dropping in data forwarding in wireless sensor network is proposed. The unique characteristics of one-direction flow in wireless sensor networks make WATCHDOG based reputation system rely on second hand information exchange to isolate selfish node. Based on link layer sequence of data and acknowledgement, this dissertation proposes a fully distributed mechanism with less security risk and lower cost. Simulation results show it can detect the selfish node and isolated it successfully. A simplified high-level game model is established to study the cooperation stimulation in ad hoc networks, an environment full of uncertainties. This dissertation analyzes the influence on cooperation condition and cooperation performance of two kinds of mistake probabilities, probability of mistaking cooperation for selfishness and probability of mistaking selfishness for cooperation. Results show that although their influence on cooperation condition is symmetric, the influence on performance is different. Threshold selection in punishment based incentive mechanism design should trade off between the two. The influence of severity of punishment on the cooperation condition and performance is also different. The severer the punishment is, the looser the cooperation condition will be, but the lower the performance will. And vice versa.
语种: 中文
内容类型: 学位论文
URI标识: http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/6496
Appears in Collections:中科院软件所

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Recommended Citation:
黄蕾. Ad hoc网络路由中的合作激励机制研究[D]. 软件研究所. 中国科学院软件研究所. 2008-01-14.
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