| 题名: | cross-layer comprehensive intrusion harm analysis for production workload server systems |
| 作者: | Zhang Shengzhi
; Jia Xiaoqi
; Liu Peng
; Jing Jiwu
|
| 会议文集: | Proceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC
|
| 会议名称: | 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2010
|
| 会议日期: | 40883
|
| 出版日期: | 2010
|
| 会议地点: | Austin, TX, United states
|
| 关键词: | Computer simulation
; Instruments
; Security systems
; Servers
|
| 出版地: | United States
|
| 收录类别: | ei
|
| ISSN: | 10639527
|
| ISBN: | 9781450000000
|
| 部门归属: | (1) Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States; (2) State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China; (3) College of Information Sciences and Technology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, United States; (4) State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate University, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
|
| 主办者: | Applied Computer Security Associates (ACSA)
|
| 英文摘要: | Analyzing the (harm of) intrusion to enterprise servers is an onerous and error-prone work. Though dynamic taint tracking enables automatic fine-grained intrusion harm analysis for enterprise servers, the significant runtime overhead introduced is generally intolerable in the production workload environment. Thus, we propose PEDA (Production Environment Damage Analysis) system, which decouples the onerous analysis work from the online execution of the production servers. Once compromised, the "has-been-infected" execution is analyzed during high fidelity replay on a separate instrumentation platform. The replay is implemented based on the heterogeneous virtual machine migration. The servers' online execution runs atop fast hardware-assisted virtual machines (such as Xen for near native speed), while the infected execution is replayed atop binary instrumentation virtual machines (such as Qemu for the implementation of taint analysis). From identified intrusion symptoms, PEDA is capable of locating the fine-grained taint seed by integrating the backward system call dependency tracking and one-step-forward taint information flow auditing. Started with the fine-grained taint seed, PEDA applies dynamic taint analysis during the replayed execution. Evaluation demonstrates the efficiency of PEDA system with runtime overhead as low as 5%. The real-life intrusion studies successfully show the comprehensiveness and the precision of PEDA's intrusion harm analysis. © 2010 ACM. |
| 语种: | 英语
|
| 内容类型: | 会议论文
|
| URI标识: | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/8712
|
| Appears in Collections: | 中科院软件所图书馆_2010软件所会议论文
|
| File Name/ File Size |
Content Type |
Version |
Access |
License |
|
|---|
| p297-zhang.pdf（1069KB） | -- | -- | 限制开放 | -- | 联系获取全文 |
|
| Recommended Citation: | |
Zhang Shengzhi,Jia Xiaoqi,Liu Peng,et al. cross-layer comprehensive intrusion harm analysis for production workload server systems[C]. 见:26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2010. Austin, TX, United states. 40883.
|
|
|
