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| RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited | |
| SeongHan Shin; Kazukuni Kobara; Hideki Imai | |
| 2008 | |
| 发表期刊 | IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems
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| 卷号 | E91-D期号:5页码:1424-1438 |
| 摘要 | The RSA-based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols have been proposed to realize both mutual authentication and generation of secure session keys where a client is sharing his/her password only with a server and the latter should generate its RSA public/private key pair (e, n), (d, n) every time due to the lack of PKI (Public-Key Infrastructures). One of the ways to avoid a special kind of off-line (so called e-residue) attacks in the RSA-based PAKE protocols is to deploy a challenge/response method by which a client verifies the relative primality of e and φ(n) interactively with a server. However, this kind of RSA-based PAKE protocols did not give any proof of the underlying challenge/response method and therefore could not specify the exact complexity of their protocols since there exists another security parameter, needed in the challenge/response method. In this paper, we first present an RSA-based PAKE (RSA-PAKE) protocol that can deploy two different challenge/response methods (denoted by Challenge/Response Method1 and Challenge/Response Method2). The main contributions of this work include: (1) Based on the number theory, we prove that the Challenge/Response Method1 and the Challenge/Response Method2 are secure against e-residue attacks for any odd prime e; (2) With the security parameter for the on-line attacks, we show that the RSA-PAKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model where all of the off-line attacks are not more efficient than on-line dictionary attacks; and (3) By considering the Hamming weight of e and its complexity in the RSA-PAKE protocol, we search for primes to be recommended for a practical use. We also compare the RSA-PAKE protocol with the previous ones mainly in terms of computation and communication complexities. |
| 收录类别 | 其他 |
| 合作性质 | 其它 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
| URI标识 | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/1360 |
| 专题 | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | SeongHan Shin,Kazukuni Kobara,Hideki Imai. RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited[J]. IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems,2008,E91-D(5):1424-1438. |
| APA | SeongHan Shin,Kazukuni Kobara,&Hideki Imai.(2008).RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited.IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems,E91-D(5),1424-1438. |
| MLA | SeongHan Shin,et al."RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited".IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems E91-D.5(2008):1424-1438. |
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