A logic for default reasoning

ISCAS OpenIR

	A logic for default reasoning
	R. Reiter
	1980
发表期刊	Artificial Intelligence
卷号	13 期号:1-2 页码:81-132
摘要	The need to make default assumptions is frequently encountered in reasoning about incompletely specified worlds. Inferences sanctioned by default are best viewed as beliefs which may well be modified or rejected by subsequent observations. It is this property which leads to the non-monotonicity of any logic of defaults. In this paper we propose a logic for default reasoning. We then specialize our treatment to a very large class of commonly occuring defaults. For this class we develop a complete proof theory and show how to interface it with a top down resolution theorem prover. Finally, we provide criteria under which the revision of derived beliefs must be effected.
收录类别	其他
合作性质	其它
语种	英语
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/1364
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	R. Reiter. A logic for default reasoning[J]. Artificial Intelligence,1980,13(1-2):81-132.
APA	R. Reiter.(1980).A logic for default reasoning.Artificial Intelligence,13(1-2),81-132.
MLA	R. Reiter."A logic for default reasoning".Artificial Intelligence 13.1-2(1980):81-132.