a covert timing channel via algorithmic complexity attacks: design and analysis

ISCAS OpenIR

	a covert timing channel via algorithmic complexity attacks: design and analysis
	Sun Xiaoshan; Cheng Liang; Zhang Yang
	2011
会议名称	2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011
会议录名称	IEEE International Conference on Communications
页码	-
会议日期	5-Jun-20
会议地点	Kyoto, Japan
收录类别	ei
出版地	United States
ISSN	5361486
ISBN	9781612842332
部门归属	(1) State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China; (2) State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
摘要	A covert channel is a communication channel that bypasses the access controls of the system, and it is a threat to the system's security. In this paper, we propose a new covert timing channel which exploits the algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities in the name lookup algorithm of the kernel. This covert channel has a high capacity and it is practically exploitable. In our experiments, the data rate reaches 2256 bps under a very low error rate. This data rate is high enough for practical use. So our covert channel is dangerous. To our knowledge, no previous works propose this covert channel nor implement it. We describe our design and implementation of the covert channel on a SELinux system, discuss the subtle issues that arose in the design, present performance data of the covert channel and analyse its capacity. © 2011 IEEE.
关键词	Access Control Algorithms Computational Complexity Design
主办者	IEEE Communication Society; IEICE Communications Society; Science Council of Japan
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/14393
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Sun Xiaoshan,Cheng Liang,Zhang Yang. a covert timing channel via algorithmic complexity attacks: design and analysis[C]. United States,2011:-.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	文献类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
a covert timing chan（143KB）			开放获取	--	请求全文