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a provable authenticated certificateless group key agreement with constant rounds
Teng Jikai; Wu Chuankun
2012
SourceJournal of Communications and Networks
ISSN1229-2370
Volume14Issue:1Pages:104-110
English AbstractGroup key agreement protocols allow a group of users, communicating over a public network, to establish a shared secret key to achieve a cryptographic goal. Protocols based on certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) are preferred since CL-PKC does not need certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and does not suffer from key escrow of identity-based cryptography. Most previous certificateless group key agreement protocols deploy signature schemes to achieve authentication and do not have constant rounds. No security model has been presented for group key agreement protocols based on CL-PKC. This paper presents a security model for a certificateless group key agreement protocol and proposes a constant-round group key agreement protocol based on CL-PKC. The proposed protocol does not involve any signature scheme, which increases the efficiency of the protocol. It is formally proven that the proposed protocol provides strong AKE-security and tolerates up to n - 2 malicious insiders for weak MA-security. The protocol also resists key control attack under a weak corruption model. © 2012 KICS.; Group key agreement protocols allow a group of users, communicating over a public network, to establish a shared secret key to achieve a cryptographic goal. Protocols based on certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) are preferred since CL-PKC does not need certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys and does not suffer from key escrow of identity-based cryptography. Most previous certificateless group key agreement protocols deploy signature schemes to achieve authentication and do not have constant rounds. No security model has been presented for group key agreement protocols based on CL-PKC. This paper presents a security model for a certificateless group key agreement protocol and proposes a constant-round group key agreement protocol based on CL-PKC. The proposed protocol does not involve any signature scheme, which increases the efficiency of the protocol. It is formally proven that the proposed protocol provides strong AKE-security and tolerates up to n - 2 malicious insiders for weak MA-security. The protocol also resists key control attack under a weak corruption model. © 2012 KICS.
Indexed TypeEI ; SCI
KeywordAuthentication Security Of Data
Department(1) State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China; (2) University of Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100049 China
SubjectComputer Science ; Telecommunications
SponsorshipNational Science Foundation of China 60903210
Language英语
WOS IDWOS:000301401500012
Citation statistics
Content Type期刊论文
URIhttp://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/14920
Collection中国科学院软件研究所
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Teng Jikai,Wu Chuankun. a provable authenticated certificateless group key agreement with constant rounds[J]. Journal of Communications and Networks,2012,14(1):104-110.
APA Teng Jikai,&Wu Chuankun.(2012).a provable authenticated certificateless group key agreement with constant rounds.Journal of Communications and Networks,14(1),104-110.
MLA Teng Jikai,et al."a provable authenticated certificateless group key agreement with constant rounds".Journal of Communications and Networks 14.1(2012):104-110.
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