distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators

ISCAS OpenIR

	distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators
	Li Xuelian; Gao Juntao; Hu Yupu; Zhang Fengrong
	2012
发表期刊	Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University
ISSN	1001-2400
卷号	39 期号:4 页码:114-119
摘要	With simple construction and easy implementation, the generalized self-shrinking generator is a keystream generator intended to be used as a stream cipher. This paper investigates the security of the generalized self-shrinking generator. We propose two distinguishing attacks on the generalized self-shrinking sequences by using the feedback polynomial and the sequence v. The results show that the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack by choosing the h^w-1 keystream bit of the generalized self-shrinking generator, if the feedback polynomial f(x) is of hamming weight w and degree h. On the other hand, if the hamming weight of f(x) is low, then the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack, and the attack complexity depends on the weight of f(x). Therefore, neither type of the polynomials can be chosen as the feedback polynomials of the generalized self-shrinking generator. Users should choose the feedback polynomial carefully, otherwise the stream cipher can suffer from distinguishing attacks.; With simple construction and easy implementation, the generalized self-shrinking generator is a keystream generator intended to be used as a stream cipher. This paper investigates the security of the generalized self-shrinking generator. We propose two distinguishing attacks on the generalized self-shrinking sequences by using the feedback polynomial and the sequence v. The results show that the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack by choosing the h^w-1 keystream bit of the generalized self-shrinking generator, if the feedback polynomial f(x) is of hamming weight w and degree h. On the other hand, if the hamming weight of f(x) is low, then the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack, and the attack complexity depends on the weight of f(x). Therefore, neither type of the polynomials can be chosen as the feedback polynomials of the generalized self-shrinking generator. Users should choose the feedback polynomial carefully, otherwise the stream cipher can suffer from distinguishing attacks.
收录类别	EI
关键词	Cryptography Polynomials Shift Registers
部门归属	(1) School of Science Xidian Univ. Xi'an 710071 China; (2) Key Lab. of Computer Networks and Information Security of Ministry of Education Xidian Univ. Xi'an 710071 China; (3) State Key Lab. of Info. Security Inst. of Software Chinese Academy of Sci. Beijing 100190 China
语种	中文
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/14987
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Li Xuelian,Gao Juntao,Hu Yupu,et al. distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators[J]. Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University,2012,39(4):114-119.
APA	Li Xuelian,Gao Juntao,Hu Yupu,&Zhang Fengrong.(2012).distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators.Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University,39(4),114-119.
MLA	Li Xuelian,et al."distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators".Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University 39.4(2012):114-119.