formal analysis of trusted platform module commands for compromising user key

ISCAS OpenIR

	formal analysis of trusted platform module commands for compromising user key
	Qin Yu; Zhao Shijun; Zhang Qianying
	2012
发表期刊	CHINA COMMUNICATIONS
ISSN	1673-5447
卷号	9 期号:10 页码:91-102
摘要	The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a dedicated hardware chip designed to provide a higher level of security for computing platform. All TPM functionalities are implemented in TPM commands to achieve specific security goals. We attempt to analyze the security properties of these commands, especially the key management API. Our study utilizes applied pi calculus to formalize the commands and determine how their security properties affect TPM key management. The attacker is assumed to call TPM commands without bounds and without knowing the TPM root key, expecting to obtain or replace the user key. The analysis goal in our study is to guarantee the corresponding property of API execution and the integrity of API data. We analyze the security properties of TPM commands with a process reduction method, identify the key-handle hijack attack on a TPM newly created key, and propose reasonable solutions to solve the problem. Then, we conduct an experiment involving a key-handle attack, which successfully replaces a user key with an attacker's key using malicious TPM software. This paper discloses the weakness of the relationship between the key handle and the key object. After the TPM software stack is compromised, the attacker can launch a key-handle attack to obtain the user key and even break into the whole storage tree of user keys.; The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a dedicated hardware chip designed to provide a higher level of security for computing platform. All TPM functionalities are implemented in TPM commands to achieve specific security goals. We attempt to analyze the security properties of these commands, especially the key management API. Our study utilizes applied pi calculus to formalize the commands and determine how their security properties affect TPM key management. The attacker is assumed to call TPM commands without bounds and without knowing the TPM root key, expecting to obtain or replace the user key. The analysis goal in our study is to guarantee the corresponding property of API execution and the integrity of API data. We analyze the security properties of TPM commands with a process reduction method, identify the key-handle hijack attack on a TPM newly created key, and propose reasonable solutions to solve the problem. Then, we conduct an experiment involving a key-handle attack, which successfully replaces a user key with an attacker's key using malicious TPM software. This paper discloses the weakness of the relationship between the key handle and the key object. After the TPM software stack is compromised, the attacker can launch a key-handle attack to obtain the user key and even break into the whole storage tree of user keys.
收录类别	SCI
关键词	Trusted Computing Tpm Tpm Command Applied Pi Calculus Api Analysis
部门归属	Qin Yu; Zhao Shijun; Zhang Qianying Chinese Acad Sci Inst Software Beijing 100190 Peoples R China.
学科领域	Telecommunications
资助者	National Natural Science Foundation of China 91118006, 61202414; Knowledge Innovation Project of Chinese Academy of Science ISCAS2009-DR14
语种	英语
WOS记录号	WOS:000310670600010
引用统计
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15062
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Qin Yu,Zhao Shijun,Zhang Qianying. formal analysis of trusted platform module commands for compromising user key[J]. CHINA COMMUNICATIONS,2012,9(10):91-102.
APA	Qin Yu,Zhao Shijun,&Zhang Qianying.(2012).formal analysis of trusted platform module commands for compromising user key.CHINA COMMUNICATIONS,9(10),91-102.
MLA	Qin Yu,et al."formal analysis of trusted platform module commands for compromising user key".CHINA COMMUNICATIONS 9.10(2012):91-102.