the higher-order meet-in-the-middle attack and its application to the camellia block cipher (extended abstract)

ISCAS OpenIR

	the higher-order meet-in-the-middle attack and its application to the camellia block cipher (extended abstract)
	Lu Jiqiang; Wei Yongzhuang; Kim Jongsung; Pasalic Enes
	2012
会议名称	13th International Conference on Cryptology in India, INDOCRYPT 2012
会议录名称	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
页码	244-264
会议日期	December 9, 2012 - December 12, 2012
会议地点	Kolkata, India
收录类别	EI
ISSN	0302-9743
ISBN	9783642349300
部门归属	(1) Institute for Infocomm Research Agency for Science Technology and Research 1 Fusionopolis Way #19-01 Connexis Singapore 138632 Singapore; (2) Guilin University of Electronic Technology Guilin City Guangxi Province 541004 China; (3) State Key Lab. of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China; (4) Department of E-Business Kyungnam University 449 Wolyoung-dong Masan Kyungnam Korea Republic of; (5) University of Primorska FAMNIT Koper Slovenia
摘要	The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is a technique for analysing the security of a block cipher. In this paper, we propose an extension of the MitM attack, which we call the higher-order meet-in-the-middle (HO-MitM) attack; the core idea of the HO-MitM attack is to use multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of "value-in-the-middle". We introduce a novel approach, which combines integral cryptanalysis with the MitM attack, to construct HO-MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia under 256 key bits, all of which include FL/FL^-1 functions. Finally, we apply an existing approach to construct HO-MitM attacks on 14-round Camellia without FL/FL^-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without FL/FL^-1 functions under 256 key bits. © Springer-Verlag 2012.; The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is a technique for analysing the security of a block cipher. In this paper, we propose an extension of the MitM attack, which we call the higher-order meet-in-the-middle (HO-MitM) attack; the core idea of the HO-MitM attack is to use multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of "value-in-the-middle". We introduce a novel approach, which combines integral cryptanalysis with the MitM attack, to construct HO-MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia under 256 key bits, all of which include FL/FL^-1 functions. Finally, we apply an existing approach to construct HO-MitM attacks on 14-round Camellia without FL/FL^-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without FL/FL^-1 functions under 256 key bits. © Springer-Verlag 2012.
关键词	Security Of Data
主办者	Defence Research and Developement Organization (D.R.D.O.); Google Inc.; Microsoft Research; National Board of Higher Mathematics (N.B.H.M.); Reserve Bank of India (R.B.I.); Tata Consultancy Services (T.C.S.)
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15815
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lu Jiqiang,Wei Yongzhuang,Kim Jongsung,et al. the higher-order meet-in-the-middle attack and its application to the camellia block cipher (extended abstract)[C],2012:244-264.