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| the higher-order meet-in-the-middle attack and its application to the camellia block cipher (extended abstract) | |
| Lu Jiqiang; Wei Yongzhuang; Kim Jongsung; Pasalic Enes | |
| 2012 | |
| Conference Name | 13th International Conference on Cryptology in India, INDOCRYPT 2012 |
| Source | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
| Pages | 244-264 |
| Conference Date | December 9, 2012 - December 12, 2012 |
| Conference Place | Kolkata, India |
| Indexed Type | EI |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 |
| ISBN | 9783642349300 |
| Department | (1) Institute for Infocomm Research Agency for Science Technology and Research 1 Fusionopolis Way #19-01 Connexis Singapore 138632 Singapore; (2) Guilin University of Electronic Technology Guilin City Guangxi Province 541004 China; (3) State Key Lab. of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China; (4) Department of E-Business Kyungnam University 449 Wolyoung-dong Masan Kyungnam Korea Republic of; (5) University of Primorska FAMNIT Koper Slovenia |
| English Abstract | The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is a technique for analysing the security of a block cipher. In this paper, we propose an extension of the MitM attack, which we call the higher-order meet-in-the-middle (HO-MitM) attack; the core idea of the HO-MitM attack is to use multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of "value-in-the-middle". We introduce a novel approach, which combines integral cryptanalysis with the MitM attack, to construct HO-MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia under 256 key bits, all of which include FL/FL-1 functions. Finally, we apply an existing approach to construct HO-MitM attacks on 14-round Camellia without FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits. © Springer-Verlag 2012.; The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack is a technique for analysing the security of a block cipher. In this paper, we propose an extension of the MitM attack, which we call the higher-order meet-in-the-middle (HO-MitM) attack; the core idea of the HO-MitM attack is to use multiple plaintexts to cancel some key-dependent component(s) or parameter(s) when constructing a basic unit of "value-in-the-middle". We introduce a novel approach, which combines integral cryptanalysis with the MitM attack, to construct HO-MitM attacks on 10-round Camellia under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia under 256 key bits, all of which include FL/FL-1 functions. Finally, we apply an existing approach to construct HO-MitM attacks on 14-round Camellia without FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits. © Springer-Verlag 2012. |
| Keyword | Security Of Data |
| Sponsorship | Defence Research and Developement Organization (D.R.D.O.); Google Inc.; Microsoft Research; National Board of Higher Mathematics (N.B.H.M.); Reserve Bank of India (R.B.I.); Tata Consultancy Services (T.C.S.) |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 会议论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15815 |
| Collection | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Lu Jiqiang,Wei Yongzhuang,Kim Jongsung,et al. the higher-order meet-in-the-middle attack and its application to the camellia block cipher (extended abstract)[C],2012:244-264. |
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