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| a real-time key recovery attack on the lightweight stream cipher a2u2 | |
| Shi Zhenqing; Feng Xiutao; Feng Dengguo; Wu Chuankun | |
| 2012 | |
| Conference Name | 11th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, CANS 2012 |
| Source | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
| Pages | 12-22 |
| Conference Date | December 12, 2012 - December 14, 2012 |
| Conference Place | Darmstadt, Germany |
| Indexed Type | EI |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 |
| ISBN | 9783642354038 |
| Department | (1) Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China; (2) Key Laboratory of Mathematics Mechanization Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China; (3) Institute of Information Engineering Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100195 China |
| English Abstract | The stream cipher A2U2 proposed by David et al. [7] is one of lightweight cipher primitives. In this paper we present a real-time key recovery attack on A2U2 under the known-plaintext-attack model, which only needs at most 210 consecutive ciphertext bits and its corresponding plaintext with the time complexity about 224.7. Our result is much better than that of the attack proposed by M. Abdelraheem et al. in [9] whose complexity is O(2 49 x C), where C is the complexity of solving a sparse quadratic equation system on 56 unknown key bits. Furthermore we provide a new approach to solving the above sparse quadratic equation system, which reduces the complexity C to a very small constant. Finally we do an entire experiment on a PC and recover all bits of a random key in a few seconds. © Springer-Verlag 2012.; The stream cipher A2U2 proposed by David et al. [7] is one of lightweight cipher primitives. In this paper we present a real-time key recovery attack on A2U2 under the known-plaintext-attack model, which only needs at most 210 consecutive ciphertext bits and its corresponding plaintext with the time complexity about 224.7. Our result is much better than that of the attack proposed by M. Abdelraheem et al. in [9] whose complexity is O(2 49 x C), where C is the complexity of solving a sparse quadratic equation system on 56 unknown key bits. Furthermore we provide a new approach to solving the above sparse quadratic equation system, which reduces the complexity C to a very small constant. Finally we do an entire experiment on a PC and recover all bits of a random key in a few seconds. © Springer-Verlag 2012. |
| Keyword | Network Security Recovery |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 会议论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15845 |
| Collection | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Shi Zhenqing,Feng Xiutao,Feng Dengguo,et al. a real-time key recovery attack on the lightweight stream cipher a2u2[C],2012:12-22. |
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