weak keys of the full misty1 block cipher for related-key differential cryptanalysis

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	weak keys of the full misty1 block cipher for related-key differential cryptanalysis
	Lu Jiqiang; Yap Wun-She; Wei Yongzhuang
	2013
会议名称	Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2013, CT-RSA 2013
会议录名称	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
页码	389-404
会议日期	February 25, 2013 - March 1, 2013
会议地点	San Francisco, CA, United states
收录类别	EI
ISSN	0302-9743
ISBN	9783642360947
部门归属	(1) Institute for Infocomm Research Agency for Science Technology and Research 1 Fusionopolis Way Singapore 138632 Singapore; (2) Faculty of Information Science and Technology Multimedia University Melaka 75450 Malaysia; (3) Guilin University of Electronic Technology Guilin City Guangxi Province 541004 China; (4) State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China
摘要	The MISTY1 block cipher has a 64-bit block length, a 128-bit user key and a recommended number of 8 rounds. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European NESSIE selected cipher, and an ISO international standard. Despite of considerable cryptanalytic efforts during the past fifteen years, there has been no published cryptanalytic attack on the full MISTY1 cipher algorithm. In this paper, we present a related-key differential attack on the full MISTY1 under certain weak key assumptions: We describe 2 ^103.57 weak keys and a related-key differential attack on the full MISTY1 with a data complexity of 2⁶¹ chosen ciphertexts and a time complexity of 2^90.93 encryptions. For the first time, our result exhibits a cryptographic weakness in the full MISTY1 cipher (when used with the recommended 8 rounds), and shows that the MISTY1 cipher is distinguishable from an ideal cipher and thus cannot be regarded to be an ideal cipher. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.; The MISTY1 block cipher has a 64-bit block length, a 128-bit user key and a recommended number of 8 rounds. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European NESSIE selected cipher, and an ISO international standard. Despite of considerable cryptanalytic efforts during the past fifteen years, there has been no published cryptanalytic attack on the full MISTY1 cipher algorithm. In this paper, we present a related-key differential attack on the full MISTY1 under certain weak key assumptions: We describe 2 ^103.57 weak keys and a related-key differential attack on the full MISTY1 with a data complexity of 2⁶¹ chosen ciphertexts and a time complexity of 2^90.93 encryptions. For the first time, our result exhibits a cryptographic weakness in the full MISTY1 cipher (when used with the recommended 8 rounds), and shows that the MISTY1 cipher is distinguishable from an ideal cipher and thus cannot be regarded to be an ideal cipher. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
关键词	Lyapunov Methods Security Of Data
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15898
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lu Jiqiang,Yap Wun-She,Wei Yongzhuang. weak keys of the full misty1 block cipher for related-key differential cryptanalysis[C],2013:389-404.