cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage

ISCAS OpenIR

	cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage
	Li Zhenqi; Zhang Bin; Yao Yuan; Lin Dongdai
	2013
会议名称	15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012
会议录名称	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
页码	141-155
会议日期	November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012
会议地点	Seoul, Korea, Republic of
收录类别	EI
ISSN	0302-9743
ISBN	9783642376818
部门归属	(1) Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing China; (2) SKLOIS Institute of Information Engineering Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing China
摘要	In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 ^10.7 time and 2^7.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 2¹⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions and 2^11.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 2³⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions with 2^8.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.; In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 ^10.7 time and 2^7.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 2¹⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions and 2^11.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 2³⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions with 2^8.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
关键词	Geometry Security Of Data
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15975
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Li Zhenqi,Zhang Bin,Yao Yuan,et al. cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage[C],2013:141-155.