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model checking security policy model using both uml static and dynamic diagrams
Cheng Liang; Zhang Yang
2011
会议名称4th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks, SIN 2011
会议录名称ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
页码159-166
会议日期November 1
会议地点Sydney, NSW, Australia
收录类别EI
ISBN9781450310208
部门归属(1) State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing 100190 China
摘要An operating system relies heavily on its security model to defend against malicious attacks. It has been one of the hottest research domains for decades to validate security models' correctness by formal methods during the development of security operating systems. However, current studies on the formal verification of security models are sometimes too sophisticated for the developers of operating systems, who are usually not experts in mathematical reasoning and proving. So representing a security model in UML becomes a compromise choice for the developers' verification work during system developing. In this paper, we propose a new method to verify the security policy model against the security goals using model checker SPIN and UML modeling language. Given a security policy model and the security property to be validated, our approach leverages UML class diagrams and statechart diagrams to specify its state model and its state transitions respectively. Then we translate these UML diagrams into the input language of SPIN automatically, as well as the security property. The conformance between the security goal and security model can finally be analyzed by SPIN. We proved the effectiveness of our approach by checking the violation of confidentiality of the DBLP model. © 2011 ACM.; An operating system relies heavily on its security model to defend against malicious attacks. It has been one of the hottest research domains for decades to validate security models' correctness by formal methods during the development of security operating systems. However, current studies on the formal verification of security models are sometimes too sophisticated for the developers of operating systems, who are usually not experts in mathematical reasoning and proving. So representing a security model in UML becomes a compromise choice for the developers' verification work during system developing. In this paper, we propose a new method to verify the security policy model against the security goals using model checker SPIN and UML modeling language. Given a security policy model and the security property to be validated, our approach leverages UML class diagrams and statechart diagrams to specify its state model and its state transitions respectively. Then we translate these UML diagrams into the input language of SPIN automatically, as well as the security property. The conformance between the security goal and security model can finally be analyzed by SPIN. We proved the effectiveness of our approach by checking the violation of confidentiality of the DBLP model. © 2011 ACM.
关键词Formal Methods Frequency Hopping Graphic Methods Network Security Security Systems
主办者The Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR); The Office of Naval Research-Global (ONRG); The Asian Office of Aerospace Research and Development (AOARD); U.S. Army RDECOM
语种英语
内容类型会议论文
URI标识http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16239
专题中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Cheng Liang,Zhang Yang. model checking security policy model using both uml static and dynamic diagrams[C],2011:159-166.
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