Denial-of-service security attack in the continuous-time world

ISCAS OpenIR

	Denial-of-service security attack in the continuous-time world
	Wang, Shuling (1); Nielson, Flemming (2); Nielson, Hanne Riis (2)
	2014
会议名称	34th IFIPWG6.1 International Conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems, FORTE 2014 - Held as Part of the 9th International Federated Conference on Distributed Computing Techniques, DisCoTec 2014
页码	149-165
会议日期	June 3, 2014 - June 5, 2014
会议地点	Berlin, Germany
收录类别	CPCI ; EI
出版地	Springer Verlag
ISSN	3029743
ISBN	9783662436127
部门归属	(1) State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China; (2) DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark
摘要	Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system. © 2014 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.; Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system. © 2014 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.
关键词	Hybrid Systems Denial-of-service Safety Verification Inference System
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16503
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wang, Shuling ,Nielson, Flemming ,Nielson, Hanne Riis . Denial-of-service security attack in the continuous-time world[C]. Springer Verlag,2014:149-165.