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| Denial-of-service security attack in the continuous-time world | |
| Wang, Shuling (1); Nielson, Flemming (2); Nielson, Hanne Riis (2) | |
| 2014 | |
| Conference Name | 34th IFIPWG6.1 International Conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components, and Systems, FORTE 2014 - Held as Part of the 9th International Federated Conference on Distributed Computing Techniques, DisCoTec 2014 |
| Pages | 149-165 |
| Conference Date | June 3, 2014 - June 5, 2014 |
| Conference Place | Berlin, Germany |
| Indexed Type | CPCI ; EI |
| Publish Place | Springer Verlag |
| ISSN | 3029743 |
| ISBN | 9783662436127 |
| Department | (1) State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China; (2) DTU Informatics, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark |
| English Abstract | Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system. © 2014 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.; Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system. © 2014 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing. |
| Keyword | Hybrid Systems Denial-of-service Safety Verification Inference System |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 会议论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16503 |
| Collection | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Wang, Shuling ,Nielson, Flemming ,Nielson, Hanne Riis . Denial-of-service security attack in the continuous-time world[C]. Springer Verlag,2014:149-165. |
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