Differential cryptanalysis and linear distinguisher of full-round Zorro

ISCAS OpenIR

	Differential cryptanalysis and linear distinguisher of full-round Zorro
	Wang, Yanfeng (1); Wu, Wenling (1); Guo, Zhiyuan (1); Yu, Xiaoli (1)
	2014
会议名称	12th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2014
页码	308-323
会议日期	June 10, 2014 - June 13, 2014
会议地点	Lausanne, Switzerland
收录类别	CPCI ; EI
出版地	Springer Verlag
ISSN	3029743
ISBN	9783319075358
部门归属	(1) Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China; (2) State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China; (3) Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100049, China
摘要	Zorro is an AES-like lightweight block cipher proposed in CHES 2013, which only uses 4 S-boxes per round. The designers showed the resistance of the cipher against various attacks and concluded the cipher has a large security margin. Recently, Guo et. al [1] have given a key recovery attack on full-round Zorro by using the internal differential characteristics. However, the attack only works for 2⁶⁴ out of 2¹²⁸ keys. In this paper, the secret key selected randomly from the whole key space can be recovered much faster than the brute-force attack. We first observe that the fourth power of the MDS matrix used in Zorro(or AES) equals to the identity matrix. Moveover, several iterated differential characteristics and iterated linear trails are found due to the interesting property. We select three characteristics with the largest probability to give the key recovery attack on Zorro and a linear trail with the largest correlation to show a linear distinguishing attack with 2 ^105.3 known plaintexts. The results show that the security of Zorro against linear and differential cryptanalysis evaluated by designers is insufficient and the security margin of Zorro is not enough. © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014.; Zorro is an AES-like lightweight block cipher proposed in CHES 2013, which only uses 4 S-boxes per round. The designers showed the resistance of the cipher against various attacks and concluded the cipher has a large security margin. Recently, Guo et. al [1] have given a key recovery attack on full-round Zorro by using the internal differential characteristics. However, the attack only works for 2⁶⁴ out of 2¹²⁸ keys. In this paper, the secret key selected randomly from the whole key space can be recovered much faster than the brute-force attack. We first observe that the fourth power of the MDS matrix used in Zorro(or AES) equals to the identity matrix. Moveover, several iterated differential characteristics and iterated linear trails are found due to the interesting property. We select three characteristics with the largest probability to give the key recovery attack on Zorro and a linear trail with the largest correlation to show a linear distinguishing attack with 2 ^105.3 known plaintexts. The results show that the security of Zorro against linear and differential cryptanalysis evaluated by designers is insufficient and the security margin of Zorro is not enough. © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014.
关键词	Zorro Block Cipher Differential Cryptanalysis Linear Distinguisher
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16512
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wang, Yanfeng ,Wu, Wenling ,Guo, Zhiyuan ,et al. Differential cryptanalysis and linear distinguisher of full-round Zorro[C]. Springer Verlag,2014:308-323.