Towards a Secure Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme

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	Towards a Secure Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
	Guo, Hui; Zhang, Zhenfeng; Zhang, Jiang; Chen, Cheng
	2013
会议名称	7th International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec)
页码	330-346
会议日期	OCT 23-25, 2013
会议地点	Melaka, MALAYSIA
收录类别	CPCI
出版地	SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN
ISSN	0302-9743
ISBN	978-3-642-41227-1; 978-3-642-41226-4
部门归属	[Guo, Hui; Zhang, Zhenfeng; Zhang, Jiang; Chen, Cheng] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Software, Trusted Comp & Informat Assurance Lab, Beijing, Peoples R China.
摘要	Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is an attractive paradigm, which gives good solutions to the problem of delegation of decryption rights. In proxy re-encryption, a semi-trusted proxy translates a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext of the same plaintext for Bob, without learning any information of the underlying message. As far as we know, previous PRE schemes are mainly in traditional public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography, thus they suffer from certificate management problem or key escrow problem in practice. In order to solve these practical problems, we aim at constructing certificateless proxy re-encryption (CL-PRE) schemes. In this paper, we first introduce a security definition against (replayable) chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for certificateless proxy re-encryption. In our security model, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users (in a specific pattern). Then, we give some evidence that it is not easy to construct a secure CL-PRE. Actually, we present an attack to the chosen plaintext secure CL-PRE scheme proposed by Xu et al. [1]. We also show a novel generic construction for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) can not be trivially adapted to CL-PRE by giving an attack to this generic construction. Finally, we present an efficient CL-PRE scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model based on well-known assumptions.; Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is an attractive paradigm, which gives good solutions to the problem of delegation of decryption rights. In proxy re-encryption, a semi-trusted proxy translates a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext of the same plaintext for Bob, without learning any information of the underlying message. As far as we know, previous PRE schemes are mainly in traditional public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography, thus they suffer from certificate management problem or key escrow problem in practice. In order to solve these practical problems, we aim at constructing certificateless proxy re-encryption (CL-PRE) schemes. In this paper, we first introduce a security definition against (replayable) chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for certificateless proxy re-encryption. In our security model, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users (in a specific pattern). Then, we give some evidence that it is not easy to construct a secure CL-PRE. Actually, we present an attack to the chosen plaintext secure CL-PRE scheme proposed by Xu et al. [1]. We also show a novel generic construction for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) can not be trivially adapted to CL-PRE by giving an attack to this generic construction. Finally, we present an efficient CL-PRE scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model based on well-known assumptions.
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16525
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Guo, Hui,Zhang, Zhenfeng,Zhang, Jiang,et al. Towards a Secure Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme[C]. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN,2013:330-346.