Institutional Repository
| Towards a Secure Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme | |
Guo, Hui ; Zhang, Zhenfeng; Zhang, Jiang; Chen, Cheng
| |
| 2013 | |
| Conference Name | 7th International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec) |
| Pages | 330-346 |
| Conference Date | OCT 23-25, 2013 |
| Conference Place | Melaka, MALAYSIA |
| Indexed Type | CPCI |
| Publish Place | SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN |
| ISSN | 0302-9743 |
| ISBN | 978-3-642-41227-1; 978-3-642-41226-4 |
| Department | [Guo, Hui; Zhang, Zhenfeng; Zhang, Jiang; Chen, Cheng] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Software, Trusted Comp & Informat Assurance Lab, Beijing, Peoples R China. |
| English Abstract | Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is an attractive paradigm, which gives good solutions to the problem of delegation of decryption rights. In proxy re-encryption, a semi-trusted proxy translates a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext of the same plaintext for Bob, without learning any information of the underlying message. As far as we know, previous PRE schemes are mainly in traditional public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography, thus they suffer from certificate management problem or key escrow problem in practice. In order to solve these practical problems, we aim at constructing certificateless proxy re-encryption (CL-PRE) schemes. In this paper, we first introduce a security definition against (replayable) chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for certificateless proxy re-encryption. In our security model, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users (in a specific pattern). Then, we give some evidence that it is not easy to construct a secure CL-PRE. Actually, we present an attack to the chosen plaintext secure CL-PRE scheme proposed by Xu et al. [1]. We also show a novel generic construction for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) can not be trivially adapted to CL-PRE by giving an attack to this generic construction. Finally, we present an efficient CL-PRE scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model based on well-known assumptions.; Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is an attractive paradigm, which gives good solutions to the problem of delegation of decryption rights. In proxy re-encryption, a semi-trusted proxy translates a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext of the same plaintext for Bob, without learning any information of the underlying message. As far as we know, previous PRE schemes are mainly in traditional public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography, thus they suffer from certificate management problem or key escrow problem in practice. In order to solve these practical problems, we aim at constructing certificateless proxy re-encryption (CL-PRE) schemes. In this paper, we first introduce a security definition against (replayable) chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for certificateless proxy re-encryption. In our security model, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users (in a specific pattern). Then, we give some evidence that it is not easy to construct a secure CL-PRE. Actually, we present an attack to the chosen plaintext secure CL-PRE scheme proposed by Xu et al. [1]. We also show a novel generic construction for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) can not be trivially adapted to CL-PRE by giving an attack to this generic construction. Finally, we present an efficient CL-PRE scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model based on well-known assumptions. |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 会议论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16525 |
| Collection | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Guo, Hui,Zhang, Zhenfeng,Zhang, Jiang,et al. Towards a Secure Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme[C]. SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN,2013:330-346. |
| Files in This Item: | There are no files associated with this item. | |||||
Items in the repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
Edit Comment