HyperVerify: A VM-assisted Architecture for Monitoring Hypervisor Non-control Data

ISCAS OpenIR

	HyperVerify: A VM-assisted Architecture for Monitoring Hypervisor Non-control Data
	Ding, Baozeng; He, Yeping; Wu, Yanjun; Lin, Yuqi
	2013
会议名称	7th IEEE International Conference on Software Security and Reliability (SERE)
页码	26-35
会议日期	JUN 18-20, 2013
会议地点	Gaithersburg, MD
收录类别	CPCI
出版地	IEEE COMPUTER SOC
ISBN	978-0-7695-5030-5
部门归属	[Ding, Baozeng; He, Yeping; Wu, Yanjun; Lin, Yuqi] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Software, Beijing 100864, Peoples R China.
摘要	Continuing bug reports and exploits in hypervisors indicate that hypervisors face similar integrity threats as tradition software. Previous approaches to protect a hypervisor that utilize hardware features are not easy to be extended. Besides, they mainly focus on code or control data integrity, without pay much attention to protecting non-control data. In this paper, we present HyperVerify, a novel architecture to monitor hypervisor non-control data using a trusted VM. Since a VM cannot directly access a hypervisor's memory, HyperVerify programs a popular device driver to read the hypervisor's hardware state in the trusted VM. Then a memory analysis library is used to translate the low-level hardware state into the high level hypervisor context. Several monitoring processes use such context to monitor hypervisor non-control data integrity. Each of the processes is responsible for monitoring one kind of non-control data. It is flexible for HyperVerify to support monitoring new kinds of data structure. The experimental evaluation of our prototype shows that HyperVerify incurs at most 4% performance overhead to end users.; Continuing bug reports and exploits in hypervisors indicate that hypervisors face similar integrity threats as tradition software. Previous approaches to protect a hypervisor that utilize hardware features are not easy to be extended. Besides, they mainly focus on code or control data integrity, without pay much attention to protecting non-control data. In this paper, we present HyperVerify, a novel architecture to monitor hypervisor non-control data using a trusted VM. Since a VM cannot directly access a hypervisor's memory, HyperVerify programs a popular device driver to read the hypervisor's hardware state in the trusted VM. Then a memory analysis library is used to translate the low-level hardware state into the high level hypervisor context. Several monitoring processes use such context to monitor hypervisor non-control data integrity. Each of the processes is responsible for monitoring one kind of non-control data. It is flexible for HyperVerify to support monitoring new kinds of data structure. The experimental evaluation of our prototype shows that HyperVerify incurs at most 4% performance overhead to end users.
关键词	Virtualization Hypervisor Introspection Non-control Data
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16531
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ding, Baozeng,He, Yeping,Wu, Yanjun,et al. HyperVerify: A VM-assisted Architecture for Monitoring Hypervisor Non-control Data[C]. IEEE COMPUTER SOC,2013:26-35.