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| DAA-related APIs in TPM 2.0 revisited | |
| Xi, Li (1); Yang, Kang (1); Zhang, Zhenfeng (1); Feng, Dengguo (1) | |
| 2014 | |
| Conference Name | 7th International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, TRUST 2014 |
| Pages | 1-18 |
| Conference Date | June 30, 2014 - July 2, 2014 |
| Conference Place | Heraklion, Crete, Greece |
| Indexed Type | EI |
| Publish Place | Springer Verlag |
| ISSN | 3029743 |
| ISBN | 9783319085920 |
| Department | (1) Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China |
| English Abstract | In TPM 2.0, a single signature primitive is proposed to support various signature schemes including Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), U-Prove and Schnorr signature. This signature primitive is implemented by several APIs which can be utilized as a static Diffie-Hellman (SDH) oracle. In this paper, we measure the practical impact of the SDH oracle in TPM 2.0 and show the security strength of these signature schemes can be weakened by 13-bit. We propose a novel property of DAA called forward anonymity and show how to utilize these DAA-related APIs to break forward anonymity. Then we propose new APIs which not only remove the SDH oracle but also support the forward anonymity, thus significantly improve the security of DAA and the other signature schemes supported by TPM 2.0. We prove the security of our new APIs under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. We prove that the proposed DAA schemes satisfied the forward anonymity property using the new APIs under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our new APIs are almost as efficient as the original APIs in TPM 2.0 specification and can support LRSW-DAA and SDH-DAA together with U-Prove as the original APIs. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.; In TPM 2.0, a single signature primitive is proposed to support various signature schemes including Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), U-Prove and Schnorr signature. This signature primitive is implemented by several APIs which can be utilized as a static Diffie-Hellman (SDH) oracle. In this paper, we measure the practical impact of the SDH oracle in TPM 2.0 and show the security strength of these signature schemes can be weakened by 13-bit. We propose a novel property of DAA called forward anonymity and show how to utilize these DAA-related APIs to break forward anonymity. Then we propose new APIs which not only remove the SDH oracle but also support the forward anonymity, thus significantly improve the security of DAA and the other signature schemes supported by TPM 2.0. We prove the security of our new APIs under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. We prove that the proposed DAA schemes satisfied the forward anonymity property using the new APIs under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our new APIs are almost as efficient as the original APIs in TPM 2.0 specification and can support LRSW-DAA and SDH-DAA together with U-Prove as the original APIs. © 2014 Springer International Publishing. |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 会议论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16577 |
| Collection | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Xi, Li ,Yang, Kang ,Zhang, Zhenfeng ,et al. DAA-related APIs in TPM 2.0 revisited[C]. Springer Verlag,2014:1-18. |
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