Automated proof for authorization protocols of TPM 2.0 in computational model

ISCAS OpenIR

	Automated proof for authorization protocols of TPM 2.0 in computational model
	Wang, Weijin (1); Qin, Yu (1); Feng, Dengguo (1)
	2014
会议名称	10th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2014
页码	144-158
会议日期	May 5, 2014 - May 8, 2014
会议地点	Fuzhou, China
收录类别	EI
出版地	Springer Verlag
ISSN	3029743
ISBN	9783319063195
部门归属	(1) Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
摘要	We present the first automated proof of the authorization protocols in TPM 2.0 in the computational model. The Trusted Platform Module(TPM) is a chip that enables trust in computing platforms and achieves more security than software alone. The TPM interacts with a caller via a predefined set of commands. Many commands reference TPM-resident structures, and use of them may require authorization. The TPM will provide an acknowledgement once receiving an authorization. This interact ensure the authentication of TPM and the caller. In this paper, we present a computationally sound mechanized proof for authorization protocols in the TPM 2.0. We model the authorization protocols using a probabilistic polynomial-time calculus and prove authentication between the TPM and the caller with the aid of the tool CryptoVerif, which works in the computational model. In addition, the prover gives the upper bounds to break the authentication between them. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.; We present the first automated proof of the authorization protocols in TPM 2.0 in the computational model. The Trusted Platform Module(TPM) is a chip that enables trust in computing platforms and achieves more security than software alone. The TPM interacts with a caller via a predefined set of commands. Many commands reference TPM-resident structures, and use of them may require authorization. The TPM will provide an acknowledgement once receiving an authorization. This interact ensure the authentication of TPM and the caller. In this paper, we present a computationally sound mechanized proof for authorization protocols in the TPM 2.0. We model the authorization protocols using a probabilistic polynomial-time calculus and prove authentication between the TPM and the caller with the aid of the tool CryptoVerif, which works in the computational model. In addition, the prover gives the upper bounds to break the authentication between them. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16620
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wang, Weijin ,Qin, Yu ,Feng, Dengguo . Automated proof for authorization protocols of TPM 2.0 in computational model[C]. Springer Verlag,2014:144-158.