ISCAS OpenIR
Automated proof for authorization protocols of TPM 2.0 in computational model
Wang, Weijin (1); Qin, Yu (1); Feng, Dengguo (1)
2014
Conference Name10th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience, ISPEC 2014
Pages144-158
Conference DateMay 5, 2014 - May 8, 2014
Conference PlaceFuzhou, China
Indexed TypeEI
Publish PlaceSpringer Verlag
ISSN3029743
ISBN9783319063195
Department(1) Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
English AbstractWe present the first automated proof of the authorization protocols in TPM 2.0 in the computational model. The Trusted Platform Module(TPM) is a chip that enables trust in computing platforms and achieves more security than software alone. The TPM interacts with a caller via a predefined set of commands. Many commands reference TPM-resident structures, and use of them may require authorization. The TPM will provide an acknowledgement once receiving an authorization. This interact ensure the authentication of TPM and the caller. In this paper, we present a computationally sound mechanized proof for authorization protocols in the TPM 2.0. We model the authorization protocols using a probabilistic polynomial-time calculus and prove authentication between the TPM and the caller with the aid of the tool CryptoVerif, which works in the computational model. In addition, the prover gives the upper bounds to break the authentication between them. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.; We present the first automated proof of the authorization protocols in TPM 2.0 in the computational model. The Trusted Platform Module(TPM) is a chip that enables trust in computing platforms and achieves more security than software alone. The TPM interacts with a caller via a predefined set of commands. Many commands reference TPM-resident structures, and use of them may require authorization. The TPM will provide an acknowledgement once receiving an authorization. This interact ensure the authentication of TPM and the caller. In this paper, we present a computationally sound mechanized proof for authorization protocols in the TPM 2.0. We model the authorization protocols using a probabilistic polynomial-time calculus and prove authentication between the TPM and the caller with the aid of the tool CryptoVerif, which works in the computational model. In addition, the prover gives the upper bounds to break the authentication between them. © 2014 Springer International Publishing.
Language英语
Content Type会议论文
URIhttp://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16620
Collection中国科学院软件研究所
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Wang, Weijin ,Qin, Yu ,Feng, Dengguo . Automated proof for authorization protocols of TPM 2.0 in computational model[C]. Springer Verlag,2014:144-158.
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