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| Attacking and fixing the CS mode | |
| Sui, Han (1); Wu, Wenling (1); Zhang, Liting (1); Wang, Peng (2) | |
| 2013 | |
| Conference Name | 15th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2013 |
| Pages | 318-330 |
| Conference Date | November 20, 2013 - November 22, 2013 |
| Conference Place | Beijing, China |
| Indexed Type | EI |
| Publish Place | Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany |
| ISSN | 3029743 |
| ISBN | 9783319027258 |
| Department | (1) Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China; (2) Data Assurance and Communication Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China |
| English Abstract | The security of the Cipher-State (CS) mode was proposed to NIST as an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme in 2004. The usual SPRP blockcipher security for AE schemes may not guarantee its security. By constructing a special SPRP, one can easily make a key-recovery attack with a single block query. The distinguishing attacks and the forgery attacks can also be made with simpler SPRP constructions. The security flaw relies in the method for generating initial whitening values. To fix this shortcoming, we propose a modified version CS* which incorporates a new method for generating initial whitening values, while keeping the main structure of CS unchanged. As we show, CS* is secure when its underlying blockcipher is an SPRP and halves of which are unpredictable. © Springer International Publishing 2013.; The security of the Cipher-State (CS) mode was proposed to NIST as an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme in 2004. The usual SPRP blockcipher security for AE schemes may not guarantee its security. By constructing a special SPRP, one can easily make a key-recovery attack with a single block query. The distinguishing attacks and the forgery attacks can also be made with simpler SPRP constructions. The security flaw relies in the method for generating initial whitening values. To fix this shortcoming, we propose a modified version CS* which incorporates a new method for generating initial whitening values, while keeping the main structure of CS unchanged. As we show, CS* is secure when its underlying blockcipher is an SPRP and halves of which are unpredictable. © Springer International Publishing 2013. |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 会议论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16647 |
| Collection | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Sui, Han ,Wu, Wenling ,Zhang, Liting ,et al. Attacking and fixing the CS mode[C]. Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany,2013:318-330. |
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