Leaked-state-forgery attack against the authenticated encryption algorithm ALE

ISCAS OpenIR

	Leaked-state-forgery attack against the authenticated encryption algorithm ALE
	Wu, Shengbao (1); Wu, Hongjun (2); Huang, Tao (2); Wang, Mingsheng (4); Wu, Wenling (1)
	2013
会议名称	19th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2013
页码	377-404
会议日期	December 1, 2013 - December 5, 2013
会议地点	Bengaluru, India
收录类别	EI
出版地	Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany
ISSN	3029743
ISBN	9783642420320
部门归属	(1) Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 8718, Beijing 100190, China; (2) Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore; (3) Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China; (4) State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
摘要	ALE is a new authenticated encryption algorithm published at FSE 2013. The authentication component of ALE is based on the strong Pelican MAC, and the authentication security of ALE is claimed to be 128-bit. In this paper, we propose the leaked-state-forgery attack (LSFA) against ALE by exploiting the state information leaked from the encryption of ALE. The LSFA is a new type of differential cryptanalysis in which part of the state information is known and exploited to improve the differential probability. Our attack shows that the authentication security of ALE is only 97-bit. And the results may be further improved to around 93-bit if the whitening key layer is removed. We implemented our attacks against a small version of ALE (using 64-bit block size instead of 128-bit block size). The experimental results match well with the theoretical results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.; ALE is a new authenticated encryption algorithm published at FSE 2013. The authentication component of ALE is based on the strong Pelican MAC, and the authentication security of ALE is claimed to be 128-bit. In this paper, we propose the leaked-state-forgery attack (LSFA) against ALE by exploiting the state information leaked from the encryption of ALE. The LSFA is a new type of differential cryptanalysis in which part of the state information is known and exploited to improve the differential probability. Our attack shows that the authentication security of ALE is only 97-bit. And the results may be further improved to around 93-bit if the whitening key layer is removed. We implemented our attacks against a small version of ALE (using 64-bit block size instead of 128-bit block size). The experimental results match well with the theoretical results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16667
专题	中国科学院软件研究所
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wu, Shengbao ,Wu, Hongjun ,Huang, Tao ,et al. Leaked-state-forgery attack against the authenticated encryption algorithm ALE[C]. Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany,2013:377-404.