Institutional Repository
| Leaked-state-forgery attack against the authenticated encryption algorithm ALE | |
| Wu, Shengbao (1); Wu, Hongjun (2); Huang, Tao (2); Wang, Mingsheng (4); Wu, Wenling (1) | |
| 2013 | |
| Conference Name | 19th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2013 |
| Pages | 377-404 |
| Conference Date | December 1, 2013 - December 5, 2013 |
| Conference Place | Bengaluru, India |
| Indexed Type | EI |
| Publish Place | Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany |
| ISSN | 3029743 |
| ISBN | 9783642420320 |
| Department | (1) Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 8718, Beijing 100190, China; (2) Division of Mathematical Sciences, School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore; (3) Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China; (4) State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China |
| English Abstract | ALE is a new authenticated encryption algorithm published at FSE 2013. The authentication component of ALE is based on the strong Pelican MAC, and the authentication security of ALE is claimed to be 128-bit. In this paper, we propose the leaked-state-forgery attack (LSFA) against ALE by exploiting the state information leaked from the encryption of ALE. The LSFA is a new type of differential cryptanalysis in which part of the state information is known and exploited to improve the differential probability. Our attack shows that the authentication security of ALE is only 97-bit. And the results may be further improved to around 93-bit if the whitening key layer is removed. We implemented our attacks against a small version of ALE (using 64-bit block size instead of 128-bit block size). The experimental results match well with the theoretical results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.; ALE is a new authenticated encryption algorithm published at FSE 2013. The authentication component of ALE is based on the strong Pelican MAC, and the authentication security of ALE is claimed to be 128-bit. In this paper, we propose the leaked-state-forgery attack (LSFA) against ALE by exploiting the state information leaked from the encryption of ALE. The LSFA is a new type of differential cryptanalysis in which part of the state information is known and exploited to improve the differential probability. Our attack shows that the authentication security of ALE is only 97-bit. And the results may be further improved to around 93-bit if the whitening key layer is removed. We implemented our attacks against a small version of ALE (using 64-bit block size instead of 128-bit block size). The experimental results match well with the theoretical results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 会议论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16667 |
| Collection | 中国科学院软件研究所 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Wu, Shengbao ,Wu, Hongjun ,Huang, Tao ,et al. Leaked-state-forgery attack against the authenticated encryption algorithm ALE[C]. Springer Verlag, Tiergartenstrasse 17, Heidelberg, D-69121, Germany,2013:377-404. |
| Files in This Item: | There are no files associated with this item. | |||||
Items in the repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
Edit Comment