ISCAS OpenIR
对一个强安全的认证密钥交换协议的分析
Alternative TitleCryptanalysis of a Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
胡学先; 魏江宏; 叶茂
2013
Source电子与信息学报
ISSN1009-5896
Issue9Pages:2278-2282
English Abstract在2012年第15届国际公钥密码学(PKC)年会上,Fujioka等人利用密钥封装机制(KEM)提出了认证密钥交换(AKE)协议的一个通用构造,称为GC协议,并在CK+模型下证明了该协议的安全性。该文对GC协议进行了安全性分析,指出该协议是不安全的,难于抵抗不知道任何秘密信息的外部攻击者实施的假冒攻击,进一步分析了原协议安全性证明中被疏忽之处。 In the 15th (2012) IACR international conference on practice and theory of Public-Key Cryptography (PKC), Fujioka et al. proposed a generic construction of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) from a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), which is called the GC protocol and is proven to be secure in the CK+security model. In this paper, it is pointed out by cryptanalysis that the GC protocol is not CK+secure. Concrete attacks in which the outside adversary, without knowing the static or ephemeral keys of the users, imitates a valid user are also given. Further, the errors in the original security proof are analyzed.
Keyword密码学 认证密钥交换 可证明安全 假冒攻击 Cryptography Authenticated Key Exchange (Ake) Provable Security Imitate Attack
Department解放军信息工程大学 郑州 450002; 中国科学院软件研究所 北京 100190 解放军信息工程大学 郑州 450002
Language中文
Content Type期刊论文
URIhttp://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16976
Collection中国科学院软件研究所
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
胡学先,魏江宏,叶茂. 对一个强安全的认证密钥交换协议的分析[J]. 电子与信息学报,2013(9):2278-2282.
APA 胡学先,魏江宏,&叶茂.(2013).对一个强安全的认证密钥交换协议的分析.电子与信息学报(9),2278-2282.
MLA 胡学先,et al."对一个强安全的认证密钥交换协议的分析".电子与信息学报 .9(2013):2278-2282.
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