Institutional Repository
| controlling data disclosure in computational pir protocols | |
| Shang Ning; Ghinita Gabriel; Zhou Yongbin; Bertino Elisa | |
| 2010 | |
| Keyword | Cryptography Law Enforcement |
| English Abstract | Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols allow users to learn data items stored at a server which is not fully trusted, without disclosing to the server the particular data element retrieved. Several PIR protocols have been proposed, which provide strong guarantees on user privacy. Nevertheless, in many application scenarios it is important to protect the database as well. In this paper, we investigate the amount of data disclosed by the the most prominent PIR protocols during a single run. We show that a malicious user can stage attacks that allow an excessive amount of data to be retrieved from the server. Furthermore, this vulnerability can be exploited even if the client follows the legitimate steps of the PIR protocol, hence the malicious request can not be detected and rejected by the server. We devise mechanisms that limit the PIR disclosure to a single data item. © 2010 ACM. |
| Department | (1) Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, United States; (2) Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China |
| Sponsorship | ACM SIGSAC |
| Pages | 310-313 |
| Language | 英语 |
| Content Type | 学位论文 |
| URI | http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/8708 |
| Collection | 基础软件国家工程研究中心 |
| Recommended Citation GB/T 7714 | Shang Ning,Ghinita Gabriel,Zhou Yongbin,et al. controlling data disclosure in computational pir protocols[D],2010. |
| Files in This Item: | ||||||
| File Name/Size | DocType | Version | Access | License | ||
| p310-shang.pdf（576KB） | 开放获取 | -- | Application Full Text | |||
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