controlling data disclosure in computational pir protocols

	controlling data disclosure in computational pir protocols
	Shang Ning; Ghinita Gabriel; Zhou Yongbin; Bertino Elisa
	2010
关键词	Cryptography Law Enforcement
摘要	Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols allow users to learn data items stored at a server which is not fully trusted, without disclosing to the server the particular data element retrieved. Several PIR protocols have been proposed, which provide strong guarantees on user privacy. Nevertheless, in many application scenarios it is important to protect the database as well. In this paper, we investigate the amount of data disclosed by the the most prominent PIR protocols during a single run. We show that a malicious user can stage attacks that allow an excessive amount of data to be retrieved from the server. Furthermore, this vulnerability can be exploited even if the client follows the legitimate steps of the PIR protocol, hence the malicious request can not be detected and rejected by the server. We devise mechanisms that limit the PIR disclosure to a single data item. © 2010 ACM.
部门归属	(1) Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, United States; (2) Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
组织者	ACM SIGSAC
页数	310-313
语种	英语
内容类型	学位论文
URI标识	http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/8708
专题	基础软件国家工程研究中心
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Shang Ning,Ghinita Gabriel,Zhou Yongbin,et al. controlling data disclosure in computational pir protocols[D],2010.

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